Funders
The British Academy & The Leverhulme Trust
P-I
Yafeng Shan
Duration
April 2020 - August 2022
Project Description
Causation has been one of the central topics in philosophy. In the recent literature, there are four main theories of causation: the probabilistic theory, the counterfactual theory, the interventionist theory, and the mechanistic theory. The probabilistic theory (Eells 1991) construes causation in a probabilistic manner: A is a cause of B if and only if A raises the probability of B in the sense that the probability of B given A is higher than the probability of B alone. The counterfactual theory (Lewis 1973) regards causal relation as a counterfactual conditional: A causes B if and only if it is true that if A had not occurred, then B would not have occurred. The interventionist theory (Woodward 2003) understands causation in a more experimental manner: A is a cause of B if and only if the relation between A and B can be used to be a experimentally stable means of producing B. The mechanistic theory (Dowe 2000) characterises causation as a continuous process: A causes B if and only if there is an appropriate physical process linking A and B. Typically the first three theories are labelled the difference-making account of causation, as they share a common idea: causes are difference-makers for their effects, in the sense that the cause makes a difference to whether or not the effect occurs. The mechanistic theory as an alternative account is usually contrasted with the difference-making account.
Both the difference-making account and the mechanistic account face serious challenges. For example, the interventionist theory limits the scope of causation to the anthropocentric realm: only factors that are experimentally manipulable are causal. Moreover, neither the mechanistic nor the difference-making account can adequately account for the need for two types of evidence—mechanistic and probabilistic—for a single causal claim. On the one hand, the proponent of the mechanistic account can’t account for the widespread use of probabilistic data and methods in causal analysis even where the underlying mechanism is uncontroversial, and, on the other, the proponent of the difference-making can’t account for the fact that mechanisms are required even when appropriate probabilistic associations are well established. In order to respond this, evidential pluralism has been proposed. Evidential pluralism maintains that neither correlative (or difference-making) evidence nor mechanistic evidence alone is sufficient to justify a causal claim. According to evidential pluralism, in order to establish a causal claim that A causes B, one normally needs to establish the existence of an appropriate conditional correlation between A and B and the existence of an appropriate mechanism complex linking A and B. This thesis was proposed in the context of health science (e.g. Russo and Williamson 2007) and has been fruitfully applied to the biomedical sciences (e.g. Clarke 2014; Parkkinen 2016; Williamson 2019). As Michael D. Rawlins puts it, evidential pluralism is "a wake-up call to the evidence-based medicine movement to incorporate mechanisms in their evaluation of ‘evidence.’ EBM+ comes of age."
Importantly, the metaphysical foundations of evidential pluralism have not yet been sufficiently examined. It is not clear what metaphysical theory of causation an evidential pluralist should be committed to. Nor is it clear in what way evidential pluralism (with its fruitful application in the biomedical sciences) shed new light on our metaphysical theories of causation. That said, the significance of the metaphysical foundations of evidential pluralism cannot be underestimated. To some extent, a defence of evidential pluralism without an articulation of its coherent metaphysical foundations is incomplete. When talking of how to assess causal claims, one has to make clear what “causes” mean in causal claims. It is difficult to imagine that one can well argue for how one should do in order to know that A causes B without articulate in what sense A causes B. And it would be a problem for evidential pluralism if causation were ontologically mechanistic or probabilistic, as a plurality of evidence for causation is not necessary in that case. Moreover, a study of the metaphysical foundation of evidential pluralism will help to situate it better in the philosophical literature of causation.
This project aims to explore the metaphysical foundations of evidential pluralism and its implications to the philosophical literature of causation.
Events
'New Perspectives on Causation in the Life Sciences' Conference (27 - 28 June 2022)
'Mixed Methods Research and Causal Inference' Workshop (5 - 6 May 2022)
'Alternative Approaches to Causation: Beyond Difference-making and Mechanism' Conference (28 -29 June 2021)
Publications
Shan, Yafeng, and Jon Williamson. 2022. “Evidential Monism, Evidential Pluralism, or Evidential Contextualism? An Introduction to Evidential Diversity in the Social Sciences.” Synthese 200(4). [open access]
Shan, Yafeng. 2022. “The Unexamined Philosophy Is Not Worth Doing: An Introduction to New Directions in Metaphilosophy.” Metaphilosophy 53(2-3): 153-158. [open access]
Shan, Yafeng. 2022. “Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods Research.” Philosophy Compass 17(1), e12804. [full text link]
Shan, Yafeng. 2022. “Philosophy Doesn’t Need a Concept of Progress.” Metaphilosophy 53(2-3): 176-184. [access] [full text link]
Shan, Yafeng. 2021. “Beyond Mendelism and Biometry.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 89: 155-163. [access] [preprint]
The British Academy & The Leverhulme Trust
P-I
Yafeng Shan
Duration
April 2020 - August 2022
Project Description
Causation has been one of the central topics in philosophy. In the recent literature, there are four main theories of causation: the probabilistic theory, the counterfactual theory, the interventionist theory, and the mechanistic theory. The probabilistic theory (Eells 1991) construes causation in a probabilistic manner: A is a cause of B if and only if A raises the probability of B in the sense that the probability of B given A is higher than the probability of B alone. The counterfactual theory (Lewis 1973) regards causal relation as a counterfactual conditional: A causes B if and only if it is true that if A had not occurred, then B would not have occurred. The interventionist theory (Woodward 2003) understands causation in a more experimental manner: A is a cause of B if and only if the relation between A and B can be used to be a experimentally stable means of producing B. The mechanistic theory (Dowe 2000) characterises causation as a continuous process: A causes B if and only if there is an appropriate physical process linking A and B. Typically the first three theories are labelled the difference-making account of causation, as they share a common idea: causes are difference-makers for their effects, in the sense that the cause makes a difference to whether or not the effect occurs. The mechanistic theory as an alternative account is usually contrasted with the difference-making account.
Both the difference-making account and the mechanistic account face serious challenges. For example, the interventionist theory limits the scope of causation to the anthropocentric realm: only factors that are experimentally manipulable are causal. Moreover, neither the mechanistic nor the difference-making account can adequately account for the need for two types of evidence—mechanistic and probabilistic—for a single causal claim. On the one hand, the proponent of the mechanistic account can’t account for the widespread use of probabilistic data and methods in causal analysis even where the underlying mechanism is uncontroversial, and, on the other, the proponent of the difference-making can’t account for the fact that mechanisms are required even when appropriate probabilistic associations are well established. In order to respond this, evidential pluralism has been proposed. Evidential pluralism maintains that neither correlative (or difference-making) evidence nor mechanistic evidence alone is sufficient to justify a causal claim. According to evidential pluralism, in order to establish a causal claim that A causes B, one normally needs to establish the existence of an appropriate conditional correlation between A and B and the existence of an appropriate mechanism complex linking A and B. This thesis was proposed in the context of health science (e.g. Russo and Williamson 2007) and has been fruitfully applied to the biomedical sciences (e.g. Clarke 2014; Parkkinen 2016; Williamson 2019). As Michael D. Rawlins puts it, evidential pluralism is "a wake-up call to the evidence-based medicine movement to incorporate mechanisms in their evaluation of ‘evidence.’ EBM+ comes of age."
Importantly, the metaphysical foundations of evidential pluralism have not yet been sufficiently examined. It is not clear what metaphysical theory of causation an evidential pluralist should be committed to. Nor is it clear in what way evidential pluralism (with its fruitful application in the biomedical sciences) shed new light on our metaphysical theories of causation. That said, the significance of the metaphysical foundations of evidential pluralism cannot be underestimated. To some extent, a defence of evidential pluralism without an articulation of its coherent metaphysical foundations is incomplete. When talking of how to assess causal claims, one has to make clear what “causes” mean in causal claims. It is difficult to imagine that one can well argue for how one should do in order to know that A causes B without articulate in what sense A causes B. And it would be a problem for evidential pluralism if causation were ontologically mechanistic or probabilistic, as a plurality of evidence for causation is not necessary in that case. Moreover, a study of the metaphysical foundation of evidential pluralism will help to situate it better in the philosophical literature of causation.
This project aims to explore the metaphysical foundations of evidential pluralism and its implications to the philosophical literature of causation.
Events
'New Perspectives on Causation in the Life Sciences' Conference (27 - 28 June 2022)
'Mixed Methods Research and Causal Inference' Workshop (5 - 6 May 2022)
'Alternative Approaches to Causation: Beyond Difference-making and Mechanism' Conference (28 -29 June 2021)
Publications
Shan, Yafeng, and Jon Williamson. 2022. “Evidential Monism, Evidential Pluralism, or Evidential Contextualism? An Introduction to Evidential Diversity in the Social Sciences.” Synthese 200(4). [open access]
Shan, Yafeng. 2022. “The Unexamined Philosophy Is Not Worth Doing: An Introduction to New Directions in Metaphilosophy.” Metaphilosophy 53(2-3): 153-158. [open access]
Shan, Yafeng. 2022. “Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods Research.” Philosophy Compass 17(1), e12804. [full text link]
Shan, Yafeng. 2022. “Philosophy Doesn’t Need a Concept of Progress.” Metaphilosophy 53(2-3): 176-184. [access] [full text link]
Shan, Yafeng. 2021. “Beyond Mendelism and Biometry.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 89: 155-163. [access] [preprint]
